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Use of Marketing Metrics: A Different Point of View
Abstract
There is a more important problem than developing new marketing metrics. Most packaged-goods
manufacturers and other marketers are not getting anywhere near full value from the metrics currently
available. In this article, I summarize some data on the underutilization of metrics, hypothesize some reasons
for this, and describe some steps to be taken to improve firms’ performance by using metrics more effectively.
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Use of Marketing Metrics:
A Different Point of View
Leonard M. Lodish, University of Pennsylvania
There is a more important problem than developing new marketing metrics. Most
packaged-goods manufacturers and other marketers are not getting anywhere near
full value from the metrics currently available. In this article, I summarize some
data on the underutilization of metrics, hypothesize some reasons for this, and
describe some steps to be taken to improve firms’ performance by using metrics
more effectively.
Firms Don’t Use Available Metrics Enough
The dot-coms that squandered hundreds of millions of dollars in 1999 and 2000
to “brand” their products and services didn’t apply any available measurement
devices to improve their performance. If they did use test markets, matched mar-
kets, split-cable markets, marketing-mix modeling, etc., it was not evident in their
decision making. They squandered literally billions of dollars of venture capital
funds on ill-conceived advertising campaigns that did not contribute to their share-
holder value. But it is not just dot-coms that are at fault; even packaged-goods
marketers, reputed to be the most sophisticated users of marketing data, don’t seem
to use available metrics as well as possible, though it looks like they may be
improving.
There have been numerous metrics available to evaluate new products before they
are introduced nationally. Traditional test markets, simulated test markets, and
split-cable markets have all been shown to be very effective at reducing the failure
rate of new products. The available data shows that packaged-goods marketers are
improving in reducing the failure rate of new products, but still have a way to go.
1992 and 2000 Data on New-Product Successes and Failures
Information Resources Inc. periodically summarizes the success and failure rates of
new products in the United States. The data come from their scanner data of food,
drug, and mass-merchandise outlets. Failure is defined as a product that either fails
to obtain more than one-sixth of the available distribution in food, drug, and
mass-merchandise outlets during its first year or a product that loses more than 30
percent of its year one distribution in year two. Figure 1 shows the data for 1992.
26 Measuring and Allocating Marcom Budgets
Figure 1. New-Product Success and Failure Rates, 1992
For the years 1997-1998 the data were summarized slightly differently into major
and minor introductions. Figure 2 shows this data.
Figure 2. Successes and Failures of Major and Minor Introductions, 1997-1998
Source: IRI New Product Trends 2000. Analysis of food/drug/mass distribution and dollar sales for new major and minor introductions
launched between October 1996 and October 1998 (looking at two years postintroduction) in 20 categories. Major: new brand or extension
into a new segment. Minor: form/flavor extension (not sizes).
There has been an improvement in new-product success in the past seven years.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that there is still much room for further
improvement. Data from the BehaviorScan test-market service shows that
improvement is possible, as Figure 3 makes clear. 
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Figure 3. In-market Testing Significantly Reduces the Risk of Failure
It is easy to show that the benefits outweigh the costs of using in-market testing.
The rest of this article discusses why there are barriers to more profitability using
existing metrics and makes some suggestions for improvement.
The Process of Using Metrics: Costs, Value of Information, and Rational
Decision Making
The general rational decision-making process is one that MBAs are exposed to
more than once in their MBA program. The process is first to establish criteria,
pick the best alternative, and then set up feedback mechanisms to continually eval-
uate the performance of the alternative. The real problem managers continually
face is the uncertainty of how the evaluation will go. Most efforts go into trying to
minimize the probability of making a decision that turns out not to have been the
best option.
Market tests, market research, and experiments can significantly reduce the proba-
bility of making a wrong decision. Deciding which market tests, research, and
experiments to run (in other words, which metrics to use) involves balancing the
costs and the value of the information. If a market test can eliminate a 30 percent
probability of losing 10 million dollars, then it has a value close to .3 times 10 mil-
lion, or 3 million dollars.
Just as decision alternatives need to be rationally considered, so do research, test-
ing, and experiment alternatives. Evaluation of the costs versus the expected value
of uncertainty reduction should be carried out for all of them. Once the research,
tests, or experiments are executed, their results must be interpreted without bias to
best evaluate the decision options that were the subjects of the research.
SOURCE:  IRI New Product Trends 2000.
Failure 
7.1%
Success
38.4%Not 
Rolled 
Out
54.5%
Of new products tested in 
BehaviorScan and introduced 
nationally, over 80% succeed.
45.5%
rolled 
out
28 Measuring and Allocating Marcom Budgets
In order to gain the most advantage from the above process, the decision makers
must challenge existing rules of thumb and other mental models to make sure that
they are consistent with incoming data and information from the marketplace.
Prerequisites for Using Metrics for More Profitable Learning
The following steps and concepts are not exclusive and may overlap in some
instances.
Temper Your Overconfidence
Behavioral researchers have shown over and over that people are generally opti-
mistic. They overrate the chance of good events happening to them and underrate
the chances of bad events. They are also overconfident about their relative skills or
prospects. For example, Colin Camerer presented data in 1996 that indicated that
90 percent of American drivers in one study thought they ranked in the top half of
their demographic group in driving skills.
The way people work in many firms may reinforce these biases toward optimism.
It is human nature when making a presentation to management to emphasize the
information supporting a new product or advertising campaign and to deempha-
size contradictory information. To counter this tendency, some managers will
assign staff to be devil’s advocates who will effectively present contrary positions.
Management compensation and motivation at many firms also reinforce the opti-
mistic biases. If new-product managers are judged on whether a new product is
successful, and if they risk being fired or discharged if the product is withdrawn,
they will do almost anything to keep the new product alive as long as possible. If
one’s career depends solely on the sales performance of a new product, one is not
likely to be very rational in viewing information that indicates that the product
will not do as well as might be hoped. If, conversely, a new-product team were
judged on the overall performance of all the firm’s new products, the team would
be much more likely to eliminate the losers to concentrate resources on the likely
winners.
The bias towards optimism causes managers to miscalculate the value of market
tests by overstating their odds of making the right decision about a new product or
advertising campaign. If managers are estimating the probability of making a
wrong decision (which is rarely done explicitly at most firms) as a way of getting at
the potential value of research, optimism will bias those calculations. For example,
even though typical large packaged-goods marketers see more than 50 percent of
their new products fail, most managers who are responsible for new products at
those firms would estimate that the probability of failure for their new products is
much lower than 50 percent—just as most drivers think they are better than aver-
age. If a senior manager would make one person or group responsible for evaluat-
ing the specific costs and value of all testing alternatives, and have that person or
group evaluate the new-product development group on how well the decisions
impacted profitability, it is less likely that the evaluations would be biased.
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Challenge the Old Wives’ Tales That Are Used as Mental Models
Perhaps the same group that is evaluating the costs and value of testing and
research projects should also be in charge of the mental models in use. First, they
would ferret out those models, rules, and paradigms. This is a big job, because it
takes analysis and probing of decisions to uncover exactly what rules, models, and
paradigms hold sway. The group would evaluate the evidence supporting the rules,
scrutinize and continuously challenge them, and keep a public record of what was
learned. That record would be widely circulated and then become a part of the
firm’s paradigms.
Don’t Overreact to Competition
Many of the old wives’ tales perhaps came about because managers have a tenden-
cy to overreact to competitive actions in spite of what the market may be telling
them. A 1996 article by J. Scott Armstrong and Fred Collopy clearly showed this
tendency. In a laboratory study in a simulated environment, when information
about competitors’ profits were provided, “over 40% of the subjects were willing to
sacrifice part of their company’s profits to beat or harm their competitor” (p. 188).
They also found in a field study of large firms over a half a century that “firms
with competitor-oriented (market share) objectives were less profitable and less
likely to survive than those whose objectives were directly oriented to profits” (p.
188).
The prevalent use of benchmarking has to be interpreted in light of the above bias.
Just because a successful competitor uses so much advertising, or gets a certain
television advertising reach or frequency does not necessarily mean that the adver-
tising is responsible for the competitor’s success. A better benchmark would be to
find the competitor who uses information and market tests the most profitably to
get clues about improving your firm’s use of tests and experiments.
Keep Time and Competitive Pressure in the Proper Perspective
All too often, time pressures are used as an excuse to avoid doing in-market tests or
performing research. George Day quotes one disgruntled manager in a packaged-
goods firm: “Concept tests are viewed as obstacles by our product managers. They
are rewarded for keeping their products moving ahead” (Day 1994, p. 13).
Sometimes when the competitive value of keeping a new product or campaign
secret is really large, time and competitive pressures may be legitimate reasons for
forgoing tests or experiments. However, the data above show large costs in prof-
itability for forgoing most in-market new-product testing. Again, as above, some-
one without a stake in the process should be evaluating the tradeoffs using all
available objective data and making recommendations to management on what
will most likely be most profitable.
A more subtle reason that time pressures get inappropriate emphasis is that many
firms promote or move their managers so often that the managers’ time horizon
precludes the test from helping during “their watch” on the product. If a test will
have value for the next three years, and a manager’s time horizon left on the brand
is nine months, then he or she will be more concerned with how the brand looks
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after nine months than three years. One way to improve this process is to evaluate
managers not just on current revenues and profits, but also on the expected value
of tests and experiments under way that will help the brand perform more prof-
itably in the future.
Conclusion
The above suggestions should help firms to improve marketing metrics’ contribu-
tion to shareholder value, whether the metrics be new or old reliable ones such as
in-market testing. I think that sometimes we turn to new technology to help us
when we could be even more productive if we used existing technology better.
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